Virtual Multipath Attack and Defense for Location Distinction in Wireless Networks
In wireless networks, location distinction aims to detect location changes or facilitate authentication of wireless users. To achieve location distinction, recent research has focused on investigating the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels. Specifically, differences in wireless channel characteristics are used to distinguish locations or identify location changes. However, we discover a new attack against all existing location distinction approaches that are built on the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels. In such an attack, the adversary can easily hide her location changes or impersonate movements by injecting fake wireless channel characteristics into a target receiver. To defend against this attack, we propose a detection technique that utilizes an auxiliary receiver or antenna to identify these fake channel characteristics. We also discuss such attacks and corresponding defenses in OFDM systems. Experimental results on our USRP-based prototype show that the discovered attack can craft any desired channel characteristic with a successful probability of 95.0% to defeat spatial uncorrelation based location distinction schemes and our novel detection method achieves a detection rate higher than 91.2% while maintaining a very low false alarm rate.
Existing location distinction approaches have been focused on exploiting the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels. These approaches demonstrated their success in various wireless scenarios, especially for the high-frequency systems (e.g., WiFi networks) that feature a very short electromagnetic wavelength. However, two recent studies identified a vulnerability of these approaches discovered that the wireless spatial uncorrelation property may be violated in a poor multipath environment (e.g., strong line-of-sight path).The work which made a further attempt to attack location distinction systems using channel impulse responses. The authors found that a third-party attacker may impersonate Alice to Bob by mimicking the channel impulse response of the wireless link between them, and the authors named such attacks as mimicry attacks. Although both mimicry attacks and the virtual multipath attacks are against the security measures based on the wireless channel characteristics, they differ from each other in the following aspects.
DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:
- Conventional attack scenario is considered
- Lack of accuracy in new attack scenario.
- Detection of attack is more complex.
We propose a detection technique utilizing an auxiliary receiver (or antenna) at a different location to identify the virtual multipath channels and the fake channel characteristics. Specifically, the attacker must craft its transmitting signal to make the target receiver believe a particular channel characteristic. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
We discover that multipath propagation can be artificially made in a lab environment, and create a technique that can successfully generate virtual multipath channels.
Based on the virtual multipath channel, we identify a new type of attack that can defeat all existing location distinction algorithms using the spatial uncorrelated property of wireless channels.
We create a defense technique to detect such attacks and protect location distinction systems. We specifically explore such attacks in OFDM systems and craft corresponding defenses according to the objective of attackers.
We implement real-world prototypes to examine the practical impact of the attacks and the effectiveness of the proposed defense method.
ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:
- New attack scenario is introduced.
- Detection rate is satisfactory when compared to other systems.
- High accuracy rate on detection of attack.
- System : Pentium Dual Core.
- Hard Disk : 120 GB.
- Monitor : 15’’ LED
- Input Devices : Keyboard, Mouse
- Ram : 1 GB
- Operating system : Windows XP/UBUNTU.
- Implementation : NS2
- NS2 Version : 2.28
- Front End : OTCL (Object Oriented Tool Command Language)
- Tool : Cygwin (To simulate in Windows OS)
Song Fang, Yao Liu, Wenbo Shen, Haojin Zhu and Tao Wang, “Virtual Multipath Attack and Defense for Location Distinction in Wireless Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2016.